The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill: Navigating a Complex Landscape
Since the government announced in the King’s Speech last year that it would bring forward a Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, the geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically. The emergence of a new Trump administration has tested long-held norms of the rules-based international order, while the economy continues to grapple with various challenges. Additionally, rapid advancements in artificial intelligence have further complicated our understanding of the evolving threat landscape. In this fast-paced environment, it is crucial to consider what should drive the government’s thinking around this much-anticipated legislation.
The Policy Statement: A Step Forward
On April 1, 2025, the Department of Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) published a policy statement outlining the proposed Cyber Security and Resilience Bill. This document indicates a significant evolution of the current regulatory regime, aiming to align the UK with the NIS2 framework adopted by the European Union. The policy statement asserts that the bill "will address specific cyber security challenges faced by the UK while aligning, where appropriate, with the approach taken by the EU NIS 2 Directive."
While the statement acknowledges that the UK faces unique cyber security challenges, it stops short of specifying what these challenges are. Nonetheless, this recognition is critical. Recent reports, such as one from the National Audit Office, have highlighted vulnerabilities within the NHS and other government sectors, underscoring the urgency of addressing these issues.
Addressing Critical National Infrastructure
The UK’s critical national infrastructure (CNI) is increasingly exposed to sophisticated threats, particularly as global geopolitical rivalries evolve, especially with nations like China and Russia. The challenge for the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is to create a comprehensive cyber and national security framework that effectively addresses these specific challenges across the CNI.
Interestingly, the policy statement does not mention the financial services industry, a vital component of the UK economy. The original NIS regulations specifically excluded financial services, raising questions about whether this exclusion will persist in the new legislation. Given that the financial sector already adheres to some of the strongest sector-specific security standards, there is a compelling argument for using these standards as a model for other sectors.
Positive Developments in the Proposed Bill
There are several elements of the proposed legislation that warrant praise. The focus on supply chain resilience, the inclusion of managed service providers (MSPs) under regulatory oversight, the recognition of data centers as part of the CNI, and the introduction of a more transparent incident reporting regime are all important and timely initiatives.
The proposed approach emphasizes "sectoral regulation," granting existing industry regulators more authority. However, this could lead to a fragmented regulatory landscape, with varying approaches across different sectors and a lack of overarching strategy. To mitigate this risk, the government plans for the Secretary of State to produce a periodic "statement of strategic priorities," aimed at fostering consistency and coherence across sectors. The effectiveness of this approach will depend on meaningful consultation with both regulators and industry stakeholders to ensure its relevance and operational viability.
The Role of the Information Commissioner’s Office
The policy statement also envisions a new role for the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). The intent is to enhance the ICO’s capability to identify and mitigate cyber risks before they materialize, thereby preventing attacks and strengthening the digital services sector against future threats. However, for the ICO to effectively assume these new responsibilities, it will require significant additional resources, skills, and capacity. Furthermore, its remit must be clearly defined to avoid duplication of efforts with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and to ensure it has the necessary authority over sectoral regulators.
Controversial Proposals and Regulatory Flexibility
One of the more contentious proposals in the policy statement is the government’s intention to grant the Secretary of State "Henry the Eighth" powers. This would allow for changes to regulations and the inclusion of additional industry sectors within the regulatory framework without the need for an Act of Parliament. While this top-down approach may be necessary in fast-moving sectors, it raises concerns about the lack of scrutiny and oversight for such changes.
The challenge lies in ensuring that the pursuit of better cyber security resilience does not become obsolete before the legislation is enacted. Additionally, the regulatory framework must strike a balance between enhancing cyber security and resilience while fostering innovation within the business ecosystem. Engaging businesses—both large and small—in this process is essential for encouraging compliance and understanding.
A Holistic Approach to Cyber Security
It is crucial to recognize that legislation and regulation alone will not solve all cyber security challenges. Alongside the proposed legislation, there must be a concerted effort to embed cyber security awareness, processes, and practices into the fabric of society. This requires a shared understanding of the threats we face and a collective determination to resist them.
In conclusion, the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill represents a significant step forward in addressing the unique challenges faced by the UK in the realm of cyber security. However, its success will depend on thoughtful implementation, meaningful engagement with stakeholders, and a commitment to fostering a culture of resilience and awareness across all sectors of society. As we navigate this complex landscape, it is imperative that we remain vigilant and proactive in our efforts to safeguard our digital future.